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Abstract: The United Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI) has become an important tool 
for measuring and comparing living standards between countries and regions. However, the HDI 
has also attracted a fair share of conceptual criticism. Starting from Andrea Wagner’s historical 
estimations of a HDI for Germany in the interwar and early post-war period, we take up part of 
that criticism by implementing three essential modifications to the mode of calculation. We test 
how far they alter our picture of the relative living standard in the Weimar Republic, the Third 
Reich, and the Federal Republic of Germany. First, we replace the arithmetic mean by the 
geometric mean, which is said to solve the problem of perfect substitutability; second, we 
extend the HDI by an additional fourth dimension measuring economic and political freedom – 
an important, though neglected, dimension; and third, as the perhaps most crucial conceptual 
intervention, we develop weighting schemes for the partial indices that are theoretically backed 
by happiness economic research. Thus, we challenge the common, but arbitrary fundamental 
assumption that all partial indices receive equal weights. Our results show that the HDI for 
Germany reacts very sensitively to conceptual interventions, making it difficult to use it for the 
intertemporal and international comparison of living standards. We also find that the proposed 
modified HDIs allow for a re-evaluation of the living standard in interwar Germany; and in 
contrast to what the reference estimations on the HDI for Germany say, there is a profound 
discontinuity between the Third Reich and post-war Germany in terms of living standards. 
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A Happiness Economics-Based Human Development Index for Germany (1920-1960) 
 
1. Objective 
What standard of living did societies maintain at different times depending on geographical, 
institutional and cultural parameters? How did some societies succeed in generating sus-
tainable economic growth and broad-based prosperity, and why did others not? How do we 
measure living standards in the first place, and are the measures that prove suitable for de-
scribing today's societies also applicable to earlier societies? Monetary indicators such as 
domestic product per capita or real wages still play a central role in answering these core 
questions of economic history. What is unsatisfactory, however, is that their application 
draws attention to the material dimension of living standards, while other important dimen-
sions are not – or at best indirectly – captured (e.g. Landes 1999; Pierenkemper 2005: 41-7; 
Maddison 2008; Allen 2011; Acemoglu/Robinson 2012; Hesse 2013: 41; and Broadberry et 
al. 2015). 
To compensate for this weakness, further measures have been established in the liter-
ature on economic history, and social sciences, in general. The indicators for the biological 
standard of living or psychological measures, but also multidimensional welfare indices, are 
of particular interest here. The latter include, for example, the Human Development Index 
(HDI), which has been regularly calculated by the United Nations since 1990 (e.g. Dasgup-
ta/Weale 1992; Steckel/Floud 1997; Baten 2003; Pierenkemper 2005: 48-50; Steckel 2008; 
Fleurbaey 2009; Deaton 2013; aus dem Moore/Schmidt 2013; Craig 2016). Constructed in its 
original form as a measure of deprivation of essential freedoms and opportunities  improv-
ing individual welfare, it measures living standards in the dimensions of health, education 
and access to material resources (or lack thereof). These sub-dimensions were measured by 
the variables life expectancy at birth (LE), adult literacy rate (AR) and logarithmic per capita 
income (PKE). For the purpose of aggregation, the values observed for any country i were 
normalized to the interval from zero to one. To do so, the minimum and maximum values 
(i.e. the worst and best values) of the variables to be observed in the country cross-section 
for the corresponding year t were used; expressed in a formula (Rao 1991; Anand/Sen 1994): 
 

























































This formula has prompted a lively discussion of the HDI’s pros and cons. The conceptual 
criticism was particularly directed at the following problem areas (Raworth/Stewart 2005; ul 
Haq 2005: 135-6; Stanton 2007; Herrero et al. 2010: 4-5; Herrero et al. 2012): First, the se-
lection of the sub-dimensions covered (e.g. Dasgupta/Weale 1992: 119; Desai 1991; Streeten 
1994: 236; Salas-Bourgoin 2014; Ray 2014); for example, are political freedom(s) and civil 
rights or sustainability aspects not missing in the consideration? Second, the choice of ap-
propriate indicators (e.g. Dasgupta/Weale 1992: 119; Streeten 1994: 236); are the chosen 
variables really the best proxy variables? Third, the choice of minimum and maximum values 
as the basis for normalization (e.g. Trabold-Nübler 1991: 239); instead of varying in the cor-
responding cross section of countries, should they not better be constant and represent 
goalposts?1 Fourth, the additive linking of the sub-indices via the arithmetic mean (e.g. Hop-
kins 1991: 1471; Desai 1991: 356; Sagar/Najam 1998: 251-2; Mazumdar 2003: 540); is the 
assumption of perfect substitutability between very different sub-dimensions implicit in the 
simple arithmetic mean theoretically really viable? Fifth, the equal weighting of the sub-
dimensions with one-third each (e.g. Kelley 1991: 318-9; Srinivasan 1994; Chowdury/Squire 
2006; Ravallion 2012: 9); is it theoretically justifiable that all sub-dimensions have the same 
significance for human development, or do we have simply to accept the normative dictum 
that this should be the case? Sixth, the inclusion of distributional issues (e.g. Sagar/Najam 
1998: 263; Trabold-Nübler 1991; Hicks 1997; Martinez 2012: 533); should greater inequality 
in income, health and education not have a negative impact on the level of a country’s HDI 
and ranking across countries? Seventh, treatment of the income variable (e.g. Sagar/Najam 
1998: 263); should we not “write off” income according to the idea of diminishing marginal 
returns? If so, how we should we do that? Finally, eighth, the overarching question related 
to the weighting procedure whether a multidimensional welfare index offers surplus value 
over the dashboard approach, according to which as many individual indicators as possible 
are interpreted separately, albeit comparatively (e.g. McGillivray 1991: 1467; Fleurbaey 
2009: 1055; Ravallion 2012: 6-10). 
The United Nations had already reacted to some criticisms at an early stage (Jahan 
2004: 155; Stanton 2007: 16-20). The following modifications had already been implemented 
when economic history finally discovered the HDI in 1997: on the one hand, there had been 
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  A change in the HDI from one year to the next can thus be generated solely by varying minimum and maxi-
mum values, which makes interpretation difficult. 
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a change of perspective; since 1991 human development had no longer been evaluated from 
the point of view of “deprivation” but rather from that of “achievement”. On the other 
hand, the education sub-dimension was covered by another variable, namely, from 1991 
onwards, first by the number of years of intermediate school attendance and then, from 
1995 onwards, by the gross enrolment rates in primary, secondary and tertiary educational 
institutions. Moreover, from 1991 onwards, no longer was logarithmic income used over the 
entire range of values observed, but it was depreciated in sections beyond a threshold of 
$5,000 – a kind of minimum standard – using a special formula. Finally, from 1995 onwards, 
the observed values were standardized on the basis of fixed minimum and maximum values 
instead of minimum and maximum values that changed from year to year (Jahan 2004: 155-
6). 
Historical HDI studies published since 1997 provide a good indication of the extent to 
which the HDI has been developed since and of the weaknesses still critically discussed. The 
first four were published in a collective volume edited by Robert Steckel and Roderick Floud 
(1997) on the question of what effect industrialization has had on the extended standard of 
living. Investigated were the United States of America in the period 1800-1970 (Cos-
ta/Steckel 1997), Great Britain 1700-1980 (Floud/Harris 1997), Sweden 1820-1965 
(Dandberg/Steckel 1997), and Germany 1871-1950 (Twarog 1997). The studies’ main chal-
lenges were to adjust the minimum and maximum values to historical conditions and to se-
lect appropriate indicators given the difficult data situation. In addition to the classic com-
ponents of the HDI, the variables height and infant mortality were also used as indicators of 
health, while the education index had to be reduced to the literacy rate in all cases (Cos-
ta/Steckel 1997: 71; Floud/Harris 1997: 115; Sandberg/Steckel 1997: 148-9; Twarog 1997: 
322-324). Following Costa and Steckel’s assessment, the historian’s benefit of using the HDI 
precisely results from the fact that the HDI is a “distance measure”, while the growth rate of 
per capita income is a “measure of the speed” of an adjustment process; i.e., both measures 
principally are complementary (Costa/Steckel 1997). 
Since then further historical studies applying the HDI have been published: Besides the 
traditional HDI, Crafts (1997a) calculated HDIs for Great Britain between 1760 and 1850 that 
included distributional and gender aspects and also the Dasgupta-Weale Index as an alterna-
tive multidimensional measure of welfare that explicitly takes into account political free-
doms and civil rights. Crafts (1997b, 2002) also calculated the classic HDI for five years (1870, 
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1913, 1950, 1973, 1992/1999) and a cross-section of countries that essentially covers the 
western states but also a few selected Latin American and Asian countries. His recalculation 
of the historical HDI values from 2002 served to incorporate the return to logarithmic in-
come over the entire value range. Wagner (2003, 2007, 2008) calculated and discussed four 
HDI variants for Germany in the period 1920 to 1960, namely the classical HDI, a Germany-
specific Development Index (DDI) expanded by additional variables such as the unemploy-
ment rate and infant mortality, a Gender-related Development Index and a HDI at the re-
gional level for the analysis of regional differences in living standards. It is particularly note-
worthy that Wagner calculated the DDI for all years between 1920 and 1939 as well as 1949 
and 1960 and was thus able to draw a detailed picture of the development of living stand-
ards, particularly in the turbulent interwar period. Astorga, Berges and Fitzgerald (2005) es-
timated the classic HDI (education index reduced to the literacy rate) for Latin America and 
the years 1900, 1950 and 2000, and Escudero and Pérez Castroviejo (2010) presented esti-
mates of the classic HDI for a specific social group, namely Spanish miners (1876-1936).2 
With Prados de la Escosura (2010, 2013, 2015a, 2015b), there are also four studies that take 
up and elaborate on Crafts’ approach. Specifically, Prados de la Escosura’s estimates covered 
almost all countries of the world and the period from 1870 to 2007 (in ten-year steps). Un-
like all previous studies, Prados de la Escosura calculated the HDI based on the multiplicative 
linkage of the sub-indices, i.e. as a geometric mean. This corresponds to the United Nations’ 
modification of the HDI of 2010 in response to the ongoing discussion on the problem of the 
additive linking of the sub-indices. Another special feature is the application of a convex 
achievement function to the sub-indices for health and education. As a result, a change in 
the corresponding variables has greater weight the higher the already achieved level.3 Final-
ly, Felice and Vasta (2015) calculated the classical HDI, also based on the geometric mean, 
for the Italian regions between 1871 and 2007 using four variables. But like Prados de la Es-
cosura (and therefore for reasons of data availability) the authors continued to use literacy 
and school attendance rates in the education index. It should be noted that in 2010 the 
United Nations began measuring education through the variables average years of schooling 
and expected years of schooling. 
                                                          
2
  It remains unclear whether the authors already use the geometric mean instead of the arithmetic mean, as 
done by the United Nations since 2010. 
3
  This reflects the view that highly developed countries may have lower marginal returns on health goods than 
less developed ones, making it more difficult for them to further improve once a high level is achieved.  
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 This cursory overview shows that the classic HDI as an alternative measure of the 
standard of living has raised economic historians’ interest. However, it has also shown that, 
in addition to the desire to derive estimates of historical HDIs as far as possible in accord-
ance with the latest conceptual standards, economic historical research can provide meth-
odological suggestions as to how the HDI can be improved in application (e.g. with regard to 
the choice of variables, the regional concept and the weighting of achievements). This is the 
starting point of this article: The aim is to modify Wagner’s (2003, 2006) detailed estimates 
of a Germany-specific Development Index (DDI) for the period 1920-1960 in three points and 
to examine to what extent this changes the picture of the development of the extended 
standard of living in Germany. The first modification is to apply the geometric mean to the 
DDI, since the multiplicative linkage of the sub-indices is now accepted as the more theoreti-
cally meaningful. The two other modifications – on the one hand, adding the sub-dimension 
of political and economic freedom to the DDI and, on the other hand, implementing a 
weighting scheme rooted in happiness economics – take up two points that are still contro-
versial, namely the selection of sub-dimensions and the theoretically problematic one-third 
or equal weighting of the sub-indices. With the latter two modifications, an attempt is made 
to react to the fundamental criticism of the HDI concept, also expressed by economic histo-
rians themselves. Wagner (2003: 181) herself conceded: “It would be desirable to derive 
individual welfare components and their weights from the preferences of individuals as de-
termined by surveys. However, no such data exist for the period under study.”4 The ap-
proach proposed in this study shows how, despite the lack of adequate data, a preference-
oriented weighting scheme can be derived by drawing on current findings of happiness eco-
nomics research. Wahl’s (2013) recent study on the standard of living in the Third Reich 
shows that happiness economics have potential for application in economic history research. 
 The following section briefly discusses Wagner’s DDI, which forms the starting point for 
this study; in the third section, the proposed modifications are discussed or, respectively, 
made plausible on a formal level. The empirical results are presented in the fourth section. 
The fifth section concludes. 
                                                          
4
  Author’s translation of the German original: "Wünschenswert wäre es, die Auswahl der einzelnen Wohl-
fahrtskomponenten und deren Gewichtungen aus den Präferenzen der Individuen abzuleiten, die aus Umfra-
gen ermittelt werden. Solche Daten liegen aber für den Untersuchungszeitraum nicht vor." 
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2. Point of departure: Wagner’s Germany-specific development Index 
Wagner’s DDI was constructed to serve as a basis for a detailed intertemporal analysis of the 
standard of living in Germany between 1920 and 1960; compared to Wagner’s classic HDI, it 
was enriched by additional indicators in the indices of material well-being and health, name-
ly the unemployment rate, life expectancy at the age of five (instead of life expectancy at 
birth), and infant, child and maternal mortality. Table 1 shows the minimum and maximum 
values for these and all other variables applied by Wagner (2008: 39-47) and which are sub-
sequently retained. 
 
Table 1: Components of Wagner’s DDI and their standardization 
   
Component Lower bound Upper bound 
   
   
(1) Gross domestic product per capita (1990 PPP $) log(100) log(40.000) 
(2) Unemployment rate 100 0 
(3) Life expectancy at birth 25 85 
(4) Life expectancy at age 5 45 75 
(5) Infant mortality 280 0 
(6) Child mortality 28 0 
(7) Maternal mortality 100 0 
(8) Tertiary enrolment rate (among the 20 to 25 year old) 0 100 
   
 
Sources: Wagner (2008: 260, 270). 
 
Figure 1: The development of the standard of living in Germany according to Wagner, 1920-
1960 
 











HDI* Durchschnitt Ländersample HDI
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Figure 1 shows the development over time of the HDI measures designed by Wagner for 
Germany as a whole. The DDI starts at an index value of about 0.48 in 1920 and rises to an 
index value of about 0.74 in 1960. With regard to the increase in the trend, two phases can 
be distinguished, namely the phases 1920 to 1935 and 1936 to 1960; in the latter, the stand-
ard of living in Germany rose more strongly than before and also increased evenly. According 
to Wagner, the marked increase in the DDI between 1936 and 1939 was due to the strong 
growth in per capita income, which more than compensated for losses in the areas of health 
and education. This shows that the National Socialist economic miracle, as widely accepted, 
was a “de-formed economic miracle”. In comparison, however, 1923 (peak of inflation and 
Franco-German tensions), 1926 (stabilization crisis of the “Golden Twenties”), 1929 (begin-
ning of the Great Depression) and 1932/1933 (peak of the Great Depression and regime 
change/normalization shock) can be identified as years in the first phase in which the DDI 
even temporarily declined, but never fell below the initial level of 1920. The standard of liv-
ing in the Weimar Republic peaked in 1930; and, after 1933, the HDI never fell below the 
level of approx. 0.53 index points. 
In addition to the DDI, Wagner also calculated the classic HDI with four variables (life 
expectancy at birth, literacy rate, gross school attendance rate, per capita income) and the 
HDI*, which, for reasons of data availability, only includes the rate of university attendance 
(i.e. students as a percentage of the 20 to 25-year-olds) as a measure of education. The lat-
ter serves as the basis for a comparison of Germany with selected European countries, 
namely Denmark, France, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzer-
land. Wagner calculated both measures for selected reference years. Compared with the 
DDI, the traditional HDI implies a much faster increase in living standards during the interwar 
period and a slower increase after 1949, while the trend in the HDI* is in line with that of the 
DDI. In an international comparison, the standard of living in Germany ranged slightly below 
the European average until 1930 (Wagner 2008: 60-62 and Appendix 1). It should also be 
noted that for all three measures the gap between 1939 and 1949/50 is relatively small 
(about 0.05 index points each), so that it can be concluded that in terms of extended living 
standards there would have been continuity between the Third Reich and the Federal Re-
public rather than between the Weimar Republic and the Federal Republic. A brief review of 
the data used to measure the extent of economic and political freedom as the basis of an 
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additional freedom index, taken from work by Prados de la Escosura and Marshall, Gurr and 
Jaggers (Prados de la Escosura 2016; Marshall et al. 2014), is done in Section 4. 
Among other things, I will show that the HDI/DDI generally reacts very sensitively to 
subtle changes in the calculation rules, rendering its use as a measure of intertemporal and 
international welfare comparison problematic from a purely technical perspective. However, 
if one does not want to dispense with the HDI/DDI in the (economic history) discussion, one 
must at least be aware of its sensitivity to both minor and major modifications. Subject to 
this aspect, it is demonstrated that, on the basis of the justified modifications, a reassess-
ment of the development of living standards in detail, especially before 1939, is indeed in 
order. 
 
3. Proposed modifications of the Germany-specific Development Index 
 
3.1. Modification one: Use of the geometric mean 
Since 2010, the United Nations have calculated the HDI as the geometric mean of the partial 
indices, i.e. formally as 
 






















where index j denotes the sub-indices (J = 1, 2, 3) and indices i and t are already known (see 
above). In addition to switching to the geometric mean, the most recent modifications of 
2010 also include the use of Gross National Product per capita instead of the Gross Domestic 
Product per capita; partially adjusted goalposts; the use of the variables mean completed 
school years and expected completed school years as substitutes for the literacy rate and 
school attendance rate in the education index; and a version of the HDI extended by inequal-
ity in all three sub-dimensions and published separately (Beja 2014: 29; Martinez 2012: 533; 
Ray 2014: 308). 
Switching to the geometric mean was a reaction to the recurring criticism that the ad-
ditive linkage of the sub-indices via the simple arithmetic mean implied perfect substitutabil-
ity between the sub-dimensions. This aspect can be illustrated by simple example. Table 2 
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reports five hypothetical constellations of sub-index values (Ravallion 2012: 202-3; Tofallis 
2013: 1329). 
If all sub-indices take on the same value, the arithmetic (AM) and geometric mean 
(GM) do not differ (see constellation A). If, however, the index values are unequal, the geo-
metrically averaged HDI (as in principle the geometric mean of any series) is always lower 
than the arithmetically averaged HDI (see constellations B to E). In particular, the greater the 
dispersion of the index values, the smaller the geometric mean is in comparison to the 
arithmetic mean (compare constellations B and C). The use of the arithmetic mean – i.e. the 
additive linkage – tacitly introduces a certain baseline assumption, namely that, for example, 
a loss in life expectancy can be fully compensated by a corresponding gain in educational 
attainment or per capita income. This can be traced in Table 2 by comparing the change in 
HDI from constellation C to constellation D – an increase of 0.1 index points in sub-index 3 – 
and from constellation C to constellation E – an increase of 0.1 index points in sub-index 1. 
While the arithmetic mean “values” both developments identically (AM equals 0.467 each), 
the geometric mean “values” the same change that occurs from C towards D more positive-
ly, as the change occurs from a lower starting point (GM increases by 0.083 compared to 
0.013) and reduces dispersion. In other words, in a sense the geometric mean punishes an 
improvement in an already strongly positive partial dimension. 
 
Table 2: Does the arithmetic mean even out unequal HDI developments? 
       
Konstellation Teilindex 1 Teilindex 2 Teilindex 3 AM GM Differenz 
       
       
A 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,500 0,000 
B 0,800 0,800 0,200 0,600 0,504 0,096 
C 0,800 0,400 0,100 0,433 0,317 0,116 
D 0,800 0,400 0,200 0,467 0,400 0,067 
E 0,900 0,400 0,100 0,467 0,330 0,136 
       
 
Sources: Author’s own depiction. 
 
The switch in mean is therefore not just a statistical gimmick, as one might think. Overall, the 
geometric mean makes it easier to assess the balance of development in the sub-areas of 
human development covered. However, it should be noted that the difference between the 
arithmetic and geometric mean, as it occurs in constellations B to E, does not automatically 
imply a lower standard of living. Rather, the difference must be taken to mean that the ap-
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plication of the geometric mean reveals a characteristic of the development process that is 
simply ignored when the arithmetic mean is applied. 
 
3.2. Modification Two: Addition of the “freedom“ dimension 
Since the HDI’s introduction, the question has repeatedly been raised as to whether there 
are other dimensions that should be taken into account in addition to the elementary sub-
dimensions of health, education and material prosperity. According to many critics, freedom 
– both political and economic – is such a further elementary but so far missing sub-
dimension (Desai 1991; Dasgupta/Weale 1992:112; Streeten 1994: 236; ul Haq 2005: 135; 
Salas-Bourgoin 2014: 36-8). According to Desai (1991: 356), although the HDI indirectly co-
vers positive freedoms, this is not enough, especially since negative freedoms are addressed 
neither directly nor indirectly. Positive freedom means having the formal, and also material, 
possibility to do something (access to resources!); negative freedom, in contrast, means en-
joying protection from restriction or third parties’ (i.e., the state or other individuals) arbi-
trary behavior (Chauffeur 2011: 4; MacMahon/Dowd 2014: 66). 
 The corresponding entry in the Encyclopedia of Public Choice can serve as a starting 
point for a critical discussion of both concepts of freedom. There it reads (Wu/Davis 2004: 
163-4): 
 
“Economic freedom refers to the quality of a free private market in which individ-
uals voluntarily carry out exchanges in their own interests. Political freedom 
means freedom from coercions by arbitrary power including the power exercised 
by the government. Political freedom consists of two basic elements: political 
rights and civil liberties. Sufficient political rights allow people to choose their rul-
ers and the way in which they are ruled. The essence of civil liberties is that peo-
ple are free to make their own decisions as long as they do not violate others’ 
identical rights.” 
 
It is certainly undisputed that both concepts are fundamentally interwoven and also have a 
value for the individual and social standard of living per se (Wu/Davis 2004: 164; Stroup 
2007: 52). It is undisputed too, however, that a major challenge is to support these state-
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ments empirically. Especially with regard to the operationalization of freedom, several prob-
lem areas arise, which will be outlined in the following. 
The literature emphasizes that economic and political freedom are multidimensional 
concepts that can only be described in terms of content by whole bundles of variables - i.e. 
in the form of freedom indices (Chauffeur 2011: 5-6; Caudill et al. 2000). Apart from variable 
selection in detail, it is often critically pointed out that freedom indices basically mix two 
groups of variables, namely on the one hand the group by which the structures or the exist-
ence and design of rules (settings/rules of the game) are measured; and on the other hand 
the group by which the results of action and the degree of enforcement are grasped. Mixing 
these groups makes the comparative interpretation of the sub-indices or the interpretation 
of the freedom index itself more difficult (Desai 2005: 190). 
Besides, it must also be taken into account that the concept of economic freedom, as 
used in the relevant literature, is based on the “paradigm of the (free) market economy”, 
which usually implies strong property protection, stable (i.e. expectation-stabilizing) prices, 
little or no trade or transaction restrictions and generally a low level of regulation (Wu/Davis 
2004: 164; Berggren 2003; De Haan et al. 206: 158). Similarly, the state form of democracy 
usually serves as a foil for the definition of political freedom; political freedom means being 
able to freely found and join already existing organizations; to enjoy freedom of opinion, 
faith and the press as well as the rule of law (subsumed under civil rights/civil liberties); and 
to be able to participate voluntarily and without restrictions in the political decision-making 
process, for example by exercising voting rights or seeking public office in the context of an 
election (subsumed under political liberties) (Wu/Davis 2004: 167; Fabro/Aixalá 2012: 1060; 
Desai 2004: 192). With regard to history in general, the question arises as to what extent 
historical societies, which were rather autocratically shaped and/or possibly heavily regulat-
ed, can be meaningfully grasped by freedom indices that are based on the superiority of the 
(free) market economy and democracy over all other forms of economic and social organiza-
tion. 
Finally, with regard to a comprehensive concept of freedom, it is not clear what the 
exact empirical relationship is between economic freedom, political freedom and civil rights 
on the one hand and freedom and economic growth or individual/societal welfare on the 
other (Fabro/Aixalá 2012: 1061-3; de Haan/Sturm 2000; Sturm/de Haan 2001; Xu/Li 2008). 
Following the Encyclopedia of Public Choice once again, but also positions formulated else-
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where, there are good reasons to assume that the realization of a high degree of economic 
freedom presupposes the existence of civil rights, but not necessarily the existence of politi-
cal freedom. Rather, we may assume with Friedman „[that] political freedom, once estab-
lished, has a tendency to destroy economic freedom“ (Wu/Davis 2004: 164).5 Especially with 
regard to historical applications, this leads to the question of how regimes that offer little or 
no political freedom actually perform on this point. Did such regimes, and do they generally, 
offer economic freedom to a degree anyway (Fabro/Aixalá 2012: 1061-3; Aixalá/Fabro 
2009)? Moreover, the question of the relationship between freedom of any kind and living 
standards is by no means trivial, since it is imaginable both that individual/societal welfare 
has a strictly linear relationship with a particular variable or the freedom index as a whole 
and that individual/societal welfare is at its maximum when the variable is at an average 
level (i.e. when there is a non-linear relationship). Could certain state interventions, e.g. to 
correct for a market failure or to provide a public good, not even be welfare enhancing indi-
vidually or collectively (Stroup 2007: 52-54)? In short: What degree of economic and political 
freedom maximizes welfare with regard to the individual and to society as a whole? 
Subject to these problematic points, a freedom index should definitely be considered 
as an additional component of the DDI, not only against the background of the fundamental 
criticism of the HDI, but especially against the background of the far-reaching political and 
economic upheavals during the period under study. This would allow drawing a more accu-
rate picture of the development of living standards. With the aim of implementing a concept 
of freedom that is as comprehensive as possible, two indices for economic and political free-
dom available in the literature will be used in the following. One is the recently published 
Historical Index of Economic Liberty (HIEL) by Prados de la Escosura (2016 2016: 6), which 
covers the period between 1850 and 2007 and all OECD countries;6 and the other is the In-
dex of Political Freedom, or Combined POLITY Score (CPS), estimated by the Polity IV Project 
for the period between 1800 and 2013 (Marshall/Gurr/Jaggers 2014: 16-7). 
                                                          
5
  This statement is attributed to Milton Friedman. It is based on the idea that politicians are fixated on maxim-
izing votes and securing re-election in the short term and therefore tend to pursue policies that benefit their 
voters by redistributing economic/political privileges (rent-seeking). One could also extend the causal chain 
by arguing that a high degree of economic freedom promotes (financial) inequality to an extreme degree, 
which in turn perverts the political decision-making process to such an extent that economic freedoms are 
reduced for certain groups and further expanded for others. 
6
  See also pages 6 to 22 for an in-depth discussion of the components of the HIEL. The Economic Freedom 




Prados de la Escosura (2016: 2-3, 13-4) addressed the above-mentioned problematic 
points in detail when developing the HIEL.  As a result, the HIEL combines four dimensions of 
economic freedom, namely the quality of the legal system (legal structure and property 
rights), the stability of the monetary system (money), the unrestricted mobility of goods and 
capital (international trade) and the degree of regulation; it follows the dictum that a coun-
try can be regarded as economically free “[...] insofar as privately owned property is securely 
protected, contracts enforced, prices stable, barriers to trade small, and resources mainly 
allocated through the market” (Prados de la Escosura 2016: 2, 11). Table 3 reports the HIEL 
values for Germany. As can be seen from the table, the HIEL takes on values between zero 
and ten, with higher values implying a greater degree of economic freedom. 
 
Table 3: The values of the Historical Index of Economic Liberty for Germany 
        
Quin-
quennial 
1910/14 1925/29 1930/34 1935/39 1950/54 1955/59 1960/64 
        
        
HIEL 8.6 7.4 7.0 5.9 7.9 8.9 9.2 
        
 
Sources: Prados de la Escosura (2016: 23-4). 
 
While Germany ranks in the middle of the distribution before the First World War (mean 
value over 20 countries: 8.6), it is at the bottom of the distribution in the interwar period 
and in the upper distribution after 1945; in the period 1930/34 only Italy (6.9) and Portugal 
(6.5) are behind Germany, and in the period 1935/39 only Italy (5.9) and Spain (3.0) (Prados 
de la Escosura 2016: 23-4). 
 The Center for Systemic Peace’ CPS is a combination of two sub-indices, namely an 
index measuring the degree of institutionalized democracy and an index measuring the de-
gree of institutionalized autocracy. Among other things, it measures whether the general 
population has the institutionalized opportunity to express preferences for alternative politi-
cal approaches or to participate in the political sphere. While the former index takes on val-
ues between zero and plus ten (low to high democracy), the latter ranges from minus ten to 
zero (high to low autocracy). Thus the CPS ranges between minus ten and plus ten, with 
changes in integer steps (Marshall/Gurr/Jaggers 2014: 14-18). In order to establish compa-
rability with the HIEL, the CPS was rescaled to the interval from zero to ten (with changes in 




Table 4: The Combined POLITY Score’s values for Germany 
        
Jahr Score Jahr Score Jahr Score Jahr Score 
        
        
1920 8 1928 8 1936 0.5 1953 10 
1921 8 1929 8 1937 0.5 1954 10 
1922 8 1930 8 1938 0.5 1955 10 
1923 8 1931 8 1939 0.5 1956 10 
1924 8 1932 8 1949 10 1957 10 
1925 8 1933 0.5 1950 10 1958 10 
1926 8 1934 0.5 1951 10 1959 10 
1927 8 1935 0.5 1952 10 1960 10 
        
 
Sources: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4v2014.xls, 11.11.2015. 
 
Figure 2: A proposal for an unweighted freedom index as part of the DDI 
 
Sources: Author’s own depiction. For the data sources, see Tables 3 and 4. 
 
In order to arrive at a historical freedom index, the HIEL and the CPS were first linked using 
the simple – i.e. unweighted – arithmetic mean.7Figure 3 shows the course of the freedom 
index in its basic form. The basic rule is that only if both dimensions of freedom are equally 
pronounced we can speak of a high degree of freedom overall. Of course, the HIEL and the 
CPS can also be linked via the geometric mean and, in principle, can be weighted unequally 
(see also Figure 3 and Section 4.2).8 
                                                          
7
  The following goalposts were used: 0 and 10 (political freedom), 2.7 and 10 (economic freedom). 
8
  The problem of the lack of data for the HIEL for the period 1920 to 1923 was solved as follows: Against the 
background of the crisis-ridden immediate post-war years (including hyperinflation, foreign trade re-
strictions), it makes no sense to take the mean value for the phases 1910/14 and 1925/29. Instead, a value 

















3.3. Modification three: A weighting scheme based on happiness economics 
This section focuses on the question of how to calculate the HDI or DDI as a weighted aver-
age, i.e. how to arrive at theoretically sound weights for the sub-indices.9 Especially the ag-
nostic equal weighting of the three sub-indices with one third each has stimulated much 
criticism, but also advocacy.10 In the absence of a theory with an empirical basis from which 
a weighting scheme could be deduced, the assumption of equal weights therefore seems to 
be a reasonable middle course.11 In the following, it is shown that this can also be handled 
differently by drawing on happiness economics. 
In fact, some attempts have been made to substantiate the weights in the HDI theoret-
ically as well as statistically. These include, for example, Principal Components Analysis. This 
is a method of multivariate statistics based on the idea that it is possible to reduce a multi-
dimensional relationship of any kind, which by definition is expressed by the fact that many 
variables interact, to a few basic variables – the principal components. The main compo-
nents, in turn, significantly determine the multidimensional relationship by their respective 
share in the total observed variance. In various cases, the application of this method has led 
to results that support the assumption of equal weights (Noorbakhsh 1998: 593; 
Biswas/Caliendo 2002; Nguefack-Tsague/Klasen/Zucchini 2011). A further approach consists 
of a two-stage procedure in which, at the first stage, the most advantageous weighting 
scheme for each country is determined on the basis of non-parametric Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA), and, at the second stage, the country-specific weights are condensed into a 
universally applicable weighting scheme by means of a regression analysis. Tofallis (2013: 
1333-6), for example, thus generated a weighting scheme that attributes by far the greatest 
weight to life expectancy with 0.732 (education: 0.056; income: 0.074).12 What is problemat-
ic about both approaches is that they generate intrinsic weights, i.e. they derive weights 
from the information – and only from the information – that is already contained in the HDI 
by definition or calculation rule. Thus, these approaches do not really address the theoretical 
                                                          
9
  Note that the choice of goalposts alone – i.e., the way in which observations are normalized for aggregation 
purposes – is one way of weighting the sub-indices. Wagner (2008: 44, 159) carries out some sensitivity 
analyses in this regard. For criticism of the standardization procedure, see e.g. Noorbakhsh (1998: 591). 
10
  See Anand and Sen (1994) for the normative dictum that all three dimensions were equally important. Sta-
pleton and Garrod (2007) argue in favour of maintaining equal weights. 
11
  On the HDI’s lacking theoretical backing, cf. Fleurbaey (2015: 1055). 
12
  These weights result from standardized data. For non-standardized data, the weights are 0.59 (long life), 
0.025 (knowledge), 0.289 (income). It should be noted that for technical reasons the weights do not add up 
to one when this approach is used. 
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problem of weighting according to individuals’ preferences. Chowdury and Squire (2006: 
766) took a step in this direction by proposing a procedure that derives weights from the 
results of opinion polls among experts on (supposed) individuals’ preferences, i.e. they for-
mally use an additional set of information. In principle, this procedure thus generates extrin-
sic weights. However, to the advantage of the advocates of the status quo, this concrete 
approach also leads to a weighting scheme that does not fundamentally deviate from the 
equal weights assumption. 
The modification proposed here is similar to the latter approach in that additional in-
formation from research on the determinants of life satisfaction is used to derive extrinsic 
weights for the components of the HDI. The concept of the HDI and happiness economics 
align in one thing: they are based on the view that purely economic, monetary indicators 
such as per capita income cannot provide a comprehensive view of the standard of living 
(Bruni/Comim/Pugno 2008: 4; Kesebir/Diener 2008: 61-2). So far, there has not been made 
an attempt at a synthesis of the two concepts, but the view dominates that both concepts 
are incompatible due to their ultimately very different basic assumptions.13 While the con-
cept of HDI is largely based on a normative notion of what is essential for a decent standard 
of living or human development, happiness economics is essentially positive, since it asks 
what determinants of well-being are directly identified as such by individuals. Accordingly, 
the primary sources of information differ. In calculating the HDI, one relies on objective indi-
cators and sub-concepts – determined in public, political discourse and therefore more fil-
tered – to calculate the HDI. By contrast, happiness economics draws its conclusions directly 
from subjective survey data (Bruni/Comim/Pugno 2008: 5-6).14 
At its core, happiness economics challenges the basic assumption of modern microe-
conomics that economic subjects showed – and showed alone – which good is more useful 
to them than another through their decisions. According to the prevailing microeconomic 
doctrine, it is action that reveals preferences, and utility is accessible to an ordinal, but not 
cardinal, measurement and is not comparable intersubjectively. In contrast, happiness eco-
nomics takes the approach of making utility measurable via the happiness function and thus 
                                                          
13
  If the two are linked, it is in the form of the question of whether the two concepts have the same implica-
tions with regard to the standard of living in a country. For example, Blanchflower/Oswald (2005) state that 
Australians are astonishingly unhappy, even though they are among the best-developed societies in terms of 
HDI. Leigh and Wolfers (2006) offer a critique of this interpretation. 
14
  An importtant proponent of the capability approach underlying the HDI is Sen (2008); an important propo-
nent of happiness economics is, for example, Easterlin (2008). 
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comparable intersubjectively. It is precisely subjective opinions and surveys that are used as 
the authoritative source (Ng 1997; Diener/Seligman 2004; Frey/Stutzer 2005: 208-10). Espe-
cially in the economic literature, the terms happiness, well-being and life satisfaction are 
usually used synonymously, whereas in psychology and sociology the terms are differentiat-
ed more precisely (Tichy 2014: 334). According to Helliwell and Barrington-Leigh (2010: 733), 
one of the characteristics of happiness is that it implies a short-term time horizon for the 
respondent and is based more on emotions and moods. In contrast, life satisfaction implies a 
long-term time horizon and a more rational evaluation of one’s own life to date.15 
The determinants of life satisfaction, as the phenomenon relevant for the happiness 
economics-based weighting scheme presented here, are determined in happiness economic 
approaches via a happiness equation, i.e. by means of statistical regression analyses. To un-
derstand the further procedure, one should know that three approaches of regression anal-
yses can be distinguished. The predominantly used approach estimates microeconomic 
equations of happiness on the basis of individual survey data (e.g. the World Values Survey), 
in which life satisfaction regularly recorded on a scale of zero to ten is regressed on the re-
spondents’ socio-economic characteristics (e.g. employment status). In a second approach, 
individually surveyed life satisfaction is first aggregated into a national average and then 
regressed on macroeconomic or social variables (e.g. per capita income). Finally, there are 
also such approaches regressing individually surveyed life satisfaction on a mix of micro- and 
macroeconomic variables (Bjørnskov/Dreher/Fischer 2008: 120; Frey/Frey Marti 2010). 
Among the important economic determinants of life satisfaction are, for example, ab-
solute and relative income, unemployment, inflation and social transfers. Individual deter-
minants include, for example, health status and fulfilling family life. Institutional determi-
nants such as the structure of the health system, personal freedom and opportunities to 
participate in political and social life have also been identified as relevant (Tichy 2014: 336-
40). For the purpose of deriving economically sound weights for the individual components 
in the DDI, in principle all approaches that measure the influence of macro-economic or so-
                                                          
15
  Graafland and Compen (2012: 2) and Tichy (2014: 335) put that similarly. Kesebir and Diener (2008: 66-7) 
have the following definition: “The term ‚subjective well-being‘(SWB) refers to people’s evaluations of their 
lives, and comprises both cognitive judgments of satisfaction and affective appraisals of moods and emo-
tions. It would be accurate to conceptualize subjective well-being as an umbrella term, consisting of a num-
ber of interrelated yet separable components, such as life satisfaction (global judgments of one’s life), satis-
faction with important life domains (e.g. marriage or work satisfaction), positive affect (prevalence of posi-




cial variables on life satisfaction are of interest. All sub-dimensions of human development 
discussed in this article and almost all variables used to operationalize them are also found 
in happiness economic studies as potential determinants of life satisfaction. Thus, it is in 
principle possible to derive a weighting scheme from the regression results that is based on 
the implicit values that individuals attribute to the determinants of life satisfaction ().16 
For this purpose, the two studies by Ovaska and Takashima (2006) and Bjørnskov, 
Dreher and Fischer (2008) have been selected from the relevant studies on the economics of 
happiness (e.g., Di Tella(MacCulloch/Oswald 2003; Helliwell 2003; Böhnke 2008; Malesevic-
Perovic/Golem 2010; Gropper/Lawson/Thome 2011; Verme 2011; Knoll/pitli/Rode 2013; 
Zagorski et al. 2014). They are among the few studies that generally consider a large number 
of control variables and especially those that relate to the sub-dimensions of human devel-
opment relevant to this article.  
 
Table 5: On the derivation of happiness economics-based weights 
     
Study Independent variable (a), 
period (b), 
countries included (c) 





     
     
Ovaska/Takashima (a) Life satisfaction Income per capita +0.0646 5.57 % 
 (10-point-scale) Unemployment –0.0164 1.41 % 
 (b) 1990-2001 Life expectancy +0.6907 59.55 % 
 (c) 68 Secondary education –0.0930 8.06 % 
  Economic freedom +0.1560 13.45 % 
  Political freedom +0.1388 11.96 % 
     
     
Bjørnskov et al. (a) Life satisfaction Income per capita +0.0165 14.73 % 
 (10-point-scale) Unemployment –0.0004 0.36 % 
 (b) 1997-2000 Life expectancy +0.0662 59.10 % 
 (c) >70 Child mortality –0.0038 3.40 % 
  Primary education –0.0159 14.20 % 
  Secondary education –0.0013 1.16 % 
  Regulatory quality –0.0037 3.30 % 
  Political freedom (Polity 
IV) 
–0.0042 3.75 % 
     
 
Notes: Point elasticities have been calculated on the basis of the reported regression results and descriptive 
statistics and have been evaluated at the mean. The following applies: Point elasticity = )(*)( yxxy  . 
Note that Ovaska and Takashima (2006) provide several models from which, firstly, average marginal effects 
were calculated. 
Sources: Ovaska/Takashima (2006) and Bjørnskov/Dreher/Fischer (2008); author’s own calculations. 
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  For the “regression approach”, cf. Slottje (1991). 
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The advantage of using these two studies is that the estimators come from a single source; 
compiling the estimators from many different studies poses methodological problems in that 
the data sources, the set and circle of control variables and the estimation methods can dif-
fer, which can lead to inconsistent results. Table 5 provides some information on the two 
studies. The third column shows which variables relevant to this study can be found in these 
two studies as control variables. 
The approach pursued here is based on the idea that weighting the sub-indices based 
on happiness economics could result from relating the strength of the influence of variable 
X1 on life satisfaction to the effect that variables X2, X3, etc., in turn exert. In order to com-
pare effect strengths, it is in principle useful to consider either elasticities or standardized 
coefficients; the former ask by how much Y changes when X increases by one percent, and 
the latter ask by how much standard deviations Y changes when X increases by one standard 
deviation. 
In this study, the comparison is made using the (point) elasticities shown in the fourth 
column of Table 5. As the sign is not relevant for the weighting, elasticities are valued at 
their absolute amount. In a first step, the effect of each variable was related to the effect of 
per capita income as the reference effect. The effect of the unemployment rate in terms of 
absolute amount is, for example, more than forty times lower than that of per capita income 
in Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008) (ǀ0,0165ǀ/ǀ0,0004ǀ = 41.25) and only about four times 
lower in Ovaska and Takashima (2006) (ǀ0,0646ǀ/ǀ0,0164ǀ = 3.94). In a second step, all rela-
tive effect sizes calculated this way were inserted into a simple system of equations, which in 
turn was solved according to the reference weight (0.0557 and 0.1473; see Table 5). In a 
third step, the weight of per capita income was used to determine the weights of the other 
variables. These are shown in the fifth column of Table 5.17 It can be seen, for example, that 
both studies give a comparably large weight to life expectancy – similar to Tofallis’s ap-
proach mentioned above – but with regard to the other weights, which together still account 
for about one third, there are differences. On the basis of the initial weights thus determined 
for the individual variables, the weights to be applied in practice at the first stage of the 
weighted mean – i.e. within the sub-indices – and at the second stage (mean of the sub-
indices themselves) were determined in a fourth step; the corresponding weights are shown 
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  In the case of weighting scheme 1, for example, the following equation was solved according to x - the 
weight of per capita income: 1 = x + 0.25x + 10.69x + 1.44x + 2.41x +2.15x. 
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in Table 6. In the following I will simply refer to weighting scheme one (Ovaska/Takashima 
data) and weighting scheme two (Bjørnskov et al. data).18 
 
Table 6: Weights applied on the first and second stages of the mean 
      
Sub-indices and variables Stage 1: Within sub-indices  Stage 2: Freedom included (ex-
cluded) 
      
      
 Ovaska/ 
Takashima 
Bjornskov  Ovaska/ 
Takashima 
Bjornskov 
      
      
Material living standard    0.070 (0.094) 0.151 (0.162) 
     Income 0.797 0.976    
     Unemployment 0.203 0.024    
Education 1.000 1.000  0.081 (0.107) 0.154 (0.166) 
Health    0.595 (0.799) 0.625 (0.672) 
     Life expectancy 0.250 0.853    
     Infant mortality 0.250 0.049    
     Child mortality 0.250 0.049    
     Maternal mortality 0.250 0.049    
Freedom    0.254 (0.000) 0.070 (0.000) 
     Economic freedom 0.529 0.468    
     Political freedom 0.471 0.532    
      
 
Sources: See Table 5; author’s own calculations. 
 
A critical aspect of this approach certainly is the implicit basic assumption that the findings 
of happiness economics can easily be applied to the past. It is by no means clear that peo-
ple’s life satisfaction at the time of the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich and the early Fed-
eral Republic was determined by the same macroeconomic variables that determine life sat-
isfaction in today’s societies. And even if there were reason to assume that the same deter-
minants were at work, people at that time could at least have attributed different subjective 
weights to them – which brings us back to the point that no subjective survey data on pref-
erences at that time is available (see the Wagner quote in Section I). The procedure chosen 
here can be checked for plausibility by reference to Wahl (2013: 97). In his study on living 
standards in the Third Reich he pointed out that among the countries examined in happiness 
economic studies there are usually those for which it holds that the level of development 
measured by per capita income and other variables is comparable with that of Germany in 
                                                          
18
  Life expectancy’s large weight could be interpreted as a strong preference for health, which is specific to 
highly developed societies, once more basic needs – e.g. for decent material well-being – are met. The level 
of development of the social insurance and especially the health care system would presumably be an im-
portant determinant. There is no doubt that the German social insurance system before 1960, and especially 
before 1945, was of a different quality. 
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the interwar period. In this respect, it is not unreasonable to assume stable and comparable 
preferences in the long term. 
 
4. Discussing the variants of the Germany-specific Development Index 
 
4.1. Influence of the mean concept on the construction of the standard of living 
How much does our picture of the development of the standard of living in Germany change 
in comparison to Wagner’s estimation, if the geometric mean is used instead of the arithme-
tic mean, but with the same data? A first look at Figure 3 immediately shows that the picture 
of a monotonically rising standard of living does not change after 1948, if one disregards the 
fact that the geometrically averaged DDI – subsequently abbreviated as DDIGM – grows 
somewhat faster on average.19 The case is quite different when looking at the interwar peri-
od. First, the mere fact that the DDIGM is lower than the DDIAM does not per se indicate a 
lower level of prosperity. In formal terms, for any given year the difference itself merely in-
dicates that the index values are scattered (see Section 3.1). However, meaningful state-
ments can be derived from the change in the difference over time, and thus from the fluctu-
ation pattern of the DDIGM. Thus, the following deviations can be recorded: First, the level of 
prosperity rises only marginally from the local minimum in 1923 to 1924 (from 0.424 to 
0.427 or by 0.7 percent compared to 3.6 percent for the DDIAM). Second, the DDIGM falls in 
1926 to a level even below the initial level of 1920 (0.407 compared to 0.415), so that 1926 
marks the absolute minimum in prosperity in the entire interwar period (according to the 
DDIAM, this is 1920); compared to the DDIAM, the increased unemployment here reflects 
much more clearly the stabilization crisis of the early “Golden Twenties” as well as the mini-
mum in university participation.20 Third, according to the DDIGM, prosperity grows more 
strongly after 1926 and also until 1931, not 1930 (2.2 versus 0.7 percent p.a. over 1926-1930 
and 2.7 versus 0.8 percent p.a. over 1926-1931); the DDIGM also shows no dent in 1929. 
Fourth, between 1931, the Weimar prosperity maximum (0.466), and 1936 prosperity falls 
steadily and significantly (by 2.3 per cent p.a.) to a level that corresponds at best to the 
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  Between 1949 and 1960, the DDI
AM
 increases by an average of 1.68 percent and the DDI
GM
 by 2.15 percent. 
20
  According to Wagner’s data, the unemployment rate jumped from 3.4 % in 1925 to 10 % in 1926. For the 
unemployment sub-index, this means a decline from 0.966 to 0.900 and for the combined sub-index of ma-
terial prosperity (plus per capita income) a decline from 0.765 to 0.733. In addition, the education sub-index 
fell from 0.180 in 1924 to 0.150 in 1925 and in 1926, the minimum in the Weimar Republic. 
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worst years of the Weimar Republic – 1920, 1925 and 1926. The year 1936, i.e. the end of 
the first phase of the National Socialist regime, when full employment was achieved, turns 
out to be the actual minimum in the development of prosperity during the pre-war phase of 
the Third Reich, and not 1933 as suggested by the DDIAM. Fifth, the DDIGM implies a stronger 
and apparently catching-up growth in prosperity after 1936 until 1939 (4.6 percent p.a. ver-
sus 2.6 percent p.a. based on the DDIAM), the absolute maximum level of prosperity (0.474) 
in the interwar period; however, the increase in prosperity beyond the level finally achieved 
in the Weimar Republic, at 0.008 index points, is more than moderate compared to what the 
DDIAM states (1930: 0.522; 1939: 0.565).21 Sixth, finally, the prosperity gap is greater be-
tween 1939 and 1949 when considering the DDIGM. 
 
Figure 3: Classic DDI – arithmetic versus geometric mean 
 
Notes: Indices equally weighted; no freedom index included. 
Sources: See Figure 1, Table 1 and Table A.1; author’s own calculations. 
 
From the temporal development of the difference between DDIAM and DDIGM (see the series 
at the bottom edge in Fig. 3), an interesting periodization of the interwar period follows: 
Two phases can be identified in which the sub-indices per capita income, education and 
health grow in an increasingly balanced manner – i.e. the dispersion between the dimen-
sions decreases –, namely between 1926 and 1932 and between 1938 and 1939. In contrast, 
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  Note that the correlation between the two series (1920-1939), measured by Pearson’s correlation coeffi-
cient, is moderately positive at 0.49. Moreover, the DDI
AM
 is growing by 0.9 percent p.a. overall over the in-
terwar period, while the DDI
GM
















an increasingly unbalanced development of prosperity characterizes the phases 1920 to 
1925 (ignoring the 1922/23 kink) and 1933 to 1937. The DDIGM makes the deformation of the 
National Socialist economic miracle immediately apparent. In comparison to Wagner’s DDI, 
“the DDIGM [the author] does [not; the author] attest that the National Socialists significantly 
increased the prosperity of the German population compared to Weimar.”22 
The comparison of standardized per capita income with the DDIGM, as shown in Figure 
3, shows that it is very important for the assessment of the development of prosperity in the 
interwar period whether one relies on the DDIAM or the DDIGM favored here. Spoerer and 
Streb (2013: 137) engaged in the analogous graphical comparison of the sub-index per capita 
income with Wagner’s DDI. This comparison is important insofar as the fundamental criti-
cism of the HDI is also grounded in the observation of a high positive correlation of the HDI 
with per capita income. And indeed, the correlation between per-capita income and the 
DDIAM is highly positive at 0.93 (1949-1960: 0.99; 1920-1960: 0.90) in the period 1920 to 
1939, so that one may get the impression that the information content of the DDI as an al-
ternative measure of propserity is more than limited. Here, too, the picture for the interwar 
period is significantly different if the DDIGM is used. It is striking that the marked slump in 
economic activity in 1923 is not reflected in the DDIGM in the same way, but in the DDIAM (see 
Figure 3). On the other hand, per capita income and the DDIGM largely follow opposite paths, 
for instance from 1922 to 1923, 1925 to 1926 and especially 1930 to 1936. It is therefore not 
surprising that Pearson’s correlation coefficient of the two series is only 0.25, suggesting a 
merely weakly positive correlation. For the post-war period (0.98) and the period 1920 to 
1960 as a whole (0.83), however, we can still speak of a high positive correlation. 
According to DDIGM, was the overall level of prosperity lower or higher compared to 
Wagner's DDIAM? This question can only be answered meaningfully within the framework of 
an international comparison. Such a comparison is possible on the basis of Table 7. For both 
mean value concepts the average HDI* (see Section 2) for the eight European comparison 
countries is shown using Wagner’s approach; the absolute and the percentage difference of 
the HDI* for Germany to the European average is shown. 
Reviewing the arithmetically averaged HDI*, the level of prosperity in the Weimar Re-
public around 1920 is initially below the European average. This shortfall is completely made 
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up for by 1930, but appears again in the period thereafter.23 A different picture emerges if 
the geometrically averaged HDI* is taken as a basis. While prosperity in Weimar around 
1920 was only slightly below the European average, it was actually above the average 
around 1930. In the Third Reich, the level of prosperity also fell more clearly below the Eu-
ropean average, and the picture again did not change for the post-war period. It can there-
fore be concluded that the geometrically averaged HDI* rates the level of prosperity in 
Weimar better than the arithmetically averaged HDI*, even in international comparison; and 
that it rates the level achieved in the Third Reich even worse.24 
 
Table 7: Comparative living standard – arithmetic versus geometric mean 
        
Year HDI* – arithmetic mean  HDI* – geometric mean 
        
        
 Ø Europe-8 Germany Difference  Ø Europe-8 Germany Difference 
        
        
1920 0.427 0.397 +0.030  
(–7.0 %) 
 0.365 0.360 +0.005 
(–1.4 %) 
1930 0.469 0.469 +0.000 
(0.0 %) 
 0.403 0.417 –0.014 
(+3.5 %) 
1940 0.508 0.482 +0.026 
(–5.1 %) 
 0.459 0.398 +0.061 
(–13.3 %) 
1950 0.594 0.544 +0.050 
(–8.4 %) 
 0.564 0.513 +0.051 
(–9.1 %) 
1960 0.680 0.646 +0.034 
(–5.0 %) 
 0.664 0.631 +0.033 
(–5.0 %) 
        
 
Notes: The HDI* of Germany as a percentage of the European average. 
Sources: See Table 1; author’s own calculations. 
 
4.2. Standard of living taking into account freedom and happiness economic-based weights 
Up to this point, the remarks on the geometrically averaged DDI have suggested that the 
level of prosperity achieved around 1926 even marked the lowest point in Weimar, but es-
pecially in the entire interwar period; that the increase in the level of prosperity over the 
late 1920s up to the Great Depression must be rated correspondingly higher; finally, that the 
level of prosperity under the National Socialists did not experience any significant increase 
over what had already been achieved in Weimar, whereby the “de-formed economic mira-
cle” shows itself directly in the DDIGM and not only, as with Wagner, in the detail, i.e. in the 
sub-indices, but not in the DDIAM as the overall picture. In the following we will have to ask 
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  Looking only at the position in the HDI* ranking, in 1920, 1930, and so on, six, six, five, seven and four coun-
tries, respectively, are ahead of Germany. 
24
  According to the geometrically averaged HDI*, Germany was surpassed in 1920, 1930, and so on by four, 
four, seven, eight and four countries, respectively. 
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to what extent this picture of the extended standard of living in the inter-war period, which 
has been corrected in essential points, will hold up if, in addition to the now undisputed ap-
plication of the simple geometric mean, the freedom index and in particular the happiness 
economics-based weights are also taken into account, two modifications that can certainly 
be controversially discussed. 
 On the basis of Figure 2 (Section 3.2) in conjunction with Table 6 (Section 3.3), one can 
guessed that the further modified DDIGM will show a clear structural break in the transition 
from 1932 to 1933; and it will also show that the very strong weighting of the health indica-
tors, three of which improved steadily, especially until 1932,25 makes the dent in the DDIGM 
around 1926 disappear. And this is exactly what Figure 4 shows. Shown are the simple DDIGM 
as well as the two versions of the further modified DDIGM, which can be distinguished ac-
cording to the respective weighting scheme, hereinafter referred to as DDIGM,F,1 and 
DDIGM,F,2.26 In comparison to the DDIGM, both extended indices up to 1932 and from 1949 
onwards predominantly and clearly range at a higher level. Between 1933 and 1939, all 
three indices roughly show the same level. If we first look at the course of the DDIGM,F,1 and 
DDIGM,F,2 in the Weimar period, we see that the strong happiness economics-based 
weighting of the health sub-dimension in both cases means that the pronounced dent in the 
DDIGM around 1926 disappears – although the level of prosperity in 1922 and 1923 continues 
to stagnate. In fact, both indices show a marked growth in prosperity up to and including 
1932. Disregarding the short-term stagnation in 1929, the DDIGM,F,1 grows by no less than 1.5 
percent p.a. over 1924 to 1932 and the DDIGM,F,2 even by 2.0 percent; in the same period the 
DDIAM and the DDIGM grow by an average of only 0.4 and 0.8 percent, respectively. So while 
the simple DDIGM for the late inflation years and the early “Golden Twenties” offers a more 
pessimistic view than Wagner’s DDI, DDIGM,F,1 and DDIGM,F,2 go into the other extreme and 
draw an even more positive picture of the development of the extended standard of living 
during the “Golden Twenties” and also, unlike Wagner, during the world economic crisis. 
Focusing on the pre-war years of the Third Reich, the living standard initially fell signifi-
cantly from 1932 to 1933, due to the restriction of political freedom. From 1934 to 1935, 
greater restrictions on economic freedom were added. All in all, the DDIGM,F,1 thus falls to a 
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  While life expectancy at birth, infant mortality and child mortality increased, maternal mortality stagnated 
until 1933 (Wagner 2008: 272). 
26
  The superscript “F” stands for “freedom index inclusive” and the superscript number indicates the weighting 
scheme (“1” for the scheme according to Ovaska/Takashima, “2” for that according to Bjørnskov et al.). 
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level of 0.407 in 1936, which is far below the level of 1920; even if the living standard con, 
analogous to the DDIAM and DDIGM, continues to rise or, respectively, rises again until 1939, 
this increase is not nearly comparable to the development in Weimar. The verdict is less 
harsh in the case of DDIGM,F,2. Although the pattern of fluctuation is almost identical to that 
of DDIGM and DDIGM,F,1, prosperity falls in comparison to Weimar at most below the level of 
1921 and in 1939 is at least at the level of 1924. If the post-war period is added, it becomes 
even clearer that the Third Reich represents a striking discontinuity in the long-term devel-
opment of the extended standard of living in Germany. 
 
Figure 4: DDIGM extended for freedom and happiness economics-based weights 
 
Notes: Indices equally weighted; AM and GM denote the arithmetic and geometric mean. 
Sources: See Figure 1, Table 1 and Table A.1; author’s own calculations. 
 
Table 8 summarizes how strongly the different DDI variants correlate with each other and 
with normalized per capita income. Splitting the interwar period, the two fully modified DDI 
measures correlate highly positively with Wagner’s DDI in the period from 1920 to 1932, but 
there is basically no correlation in the period between 1933 and 1939 – and this without the 
structural break in 1932/1933 even being recorded. So while the correlation of the DDIGM,F,1 
and the DDIGM,F,2 with per capita income is moderately positive, it is zero or even negative in 













DDI GM inkl. Freiheit (Gewichtungsschema 1)
DDI GM inkl. Freiheit (Gewichtungsschema 2)
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Table 8: How strongly do the variants of the DDI correlate with each other and with income 
per capita? 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Period DDI
GM



























      
      
A) Correlation among the variants of the DDI 
      
1920-1932 0.61 0.57 0.69 0.86 0.84 
1933-1939 0.48 0.78 0.94 0.32 0.08 
1920-1939 0.49 0.07 0.56 –0.45 0.17 
1949-1960 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 
1920-1960 0.98 0.91 0.98 0.86 0.96 
      











 – PKE DDI
GM, F, 2 
– PKE  
      
      
B) Correlation with income per capita 
      
1920-1932 0.83 –0.67 0.60 0.49  
1933-1939 0.94 0.05 0.02 –0.20  
1920-1939 0.93 0.25 –0.44 0.03  
1949-1960 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.98  
1920-1960 0.90 0.83 0.63 0.77  
      
 
Notes: Given are the correlation coefficients according to Pearson. 
Sources: Author’s own calculations. 
 
Table 9: Comparative living standard – freedom and preferences taken into account 
        
Year HDI* – geometric mean, freedom included, 
weighting scheme1 
 HDI* – geometric mean, freedom included, 
weighting scheme2 
        
        
 Ø Europe-8 Germany Difference  Ø Europe-8 Germany Difference 
        
        
1920 0.548 0.479 + 0.069 
(–12.6 %) 
 0.463 0.415 + 0.048 
( –10.5 %) 
1930 0.577 0.563 + 0.014 
(–2.4 %) 
 0.506 0.508 – 0.002 
(+0.4 %) 
1940 0.505 0.395 + 0.110 
(–22.8 %) 
 0.509 0.457 + 0.052 
(–10.0 %) 
1950 0.713 0.677 + 0.036 
(–5.0 %) 
 0.654 0.613 + 0.041 
(–6.3 %) 
1960 0.769 0.756 + 0.013 
(–1.7 %) 
 0.727 0.699 + 0.028 
(–3.9 %) 
        
 
Notes: The HDI* of Germany as a percentage of the European average.  
Sources: See Table 1; author’s own calculations. 
 
Finally, on the basis of Table 9 and analogous to the explanations in the previous section, the 
level of prosperity in Germany can be determined in a European comparison if political and 
economic freedoms and preferences are included in the analysis. If weighting scheme two is 
used, the picture is broadly similar to that obtained on the basis of the DDIAM (see above) 
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with the exception of 1940. If, on the other hand, weighting scheme one is used, the living 
standard in Germany in 1920 and especially in 1940 is even more clearly below the European 
average. However, the 1960 level is only marginally lower. A comparison with the European 
average also shows that the choice of the DDI measure is particularly important, since no 
two variants allow drawing the exact same conclusions about the development of the ex-
tended standard of living. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In their recent textbook on German economic history, Mark Spoerer and Jochen Streb  
(2013: 138-9) criticized the HDI/DDI; they state: “Wagner herself emphasizes that the result 
of the prosperity analysis using development indices depends largely on the indicators cho-
sen and their weighting. We would like to formulate this correct insight more clearly here: As 
long as there is no theoretical and empirical basis for a particular variant of the HDI, anyone 
can manipulate the value of the measure of prosperity according to his or her own objec-
tives by skilfully selecting indicators and weights.” The approach to the modification of the 
Germany-specific Development Index presented in this article directly addresses Spoerer 
and Streb’s fundamental criticism. Although it was certainly not possible to present a conclu-
sive solution to the problem of selection and weighting, the approach does show how one 
can arrive at a theoretically and empirically better founded variant of the DDI – and ulti-
mately of the HDI. There is no doubt that the DDI should be recalculated using the geometric 
mean, thereby only following the United Nations’ and the scientific community’s current 
practice. Beyond that, adding political and economic freedom and, in particular, considering 
weights rooted in happiness economics and based on subjective preferences should is de-
batable. 
 The analysis has shown that the HDI/DDI actually reacts very sensitively to changes in 
the way of calculating. Since the interested (economic) historian now has several variants of 
the DDI at hand, the decision for or against one of these variants is of particular importance 
as part of her own argumentation. And this is all the more true as the variants differ not only 
on a formal level but also, and especially, on a content-wise. By providing a menu of alterna-
tive measures, the future use of the DDI for intertemporal and international comparisons of 
living standards will ultimately be more difficult than it will be easier. It should be noted that 
all three variants of the DDI based on the geometric mean are fundamentally more pessimis-
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tic about the development of living standards in the Third Reich than Wagner’s reference 
DDI is. As to the question of how much the standard of living in the Third Reich lagged be-
hind that of Weimar, it is the concrete selection that matters. The most pessimistic picture is 
drawn by DDIGM,F,1, the most optimistic by DDIAM. It is also clear that on the basis of the ge-
ometrically averaged DDI variants, it is no longer possible to argue convincingly that there is 
a clear continuity between the Third Reich and the Federal Republic in terms of the extend-
ed standard of living. In particular, it can be argued on the basis of this article that even the 
stronger, albeit deformed, economic growth under National Socialism could not in fact over-
compensate for the progress in education and living standards already achieved in the Wei-
mar Republic. This result is also relevant to the broader economic-historical debate on socio-
economic continuities and discontinuities between the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich 
and the Federal Republic, in so far as the advocates of continuity between Weimar and the 
Federal Republic can now draw on a further argument (Ritschl 2005; Spoerer 2016). All in all, 
if one wishes to discuss the development of living standards in Germany on the basis of a 
theoretically and empirically better founded variant of the DDI, one cannot avoid dealing 
more intensively with the happiness economics-based variants presented in this article. If, 
however, one cannot accept the extension of the DDI for the aspect of freedom in combina-
tion with a preference-oriented weighting anchored in the present, the simple geometrically 
averaged DDI still remains. Its time pattern, just like the weighted variants, invites us to reas-
sess the development of the living standard in the interwar period. 
For other readers, the incorporated modifications may not go far enough. Future work 
on the historical HDI/DDI could, for example, address the question of whether the weighting 
of the sub-dimensions should not rather be varying over time. Instead of looking at the de-
terminants of life satisfaction, the determinants of happiness in the more narrow sense of 
the word could be used. In the first case, the determinants can be regarded as basically sta-
ble over a longer period of time, which justifies static weights. However, if one looks at hap-
piness in the more narrow sense of the word, one should consider dynamic weights, since 
the feeling happy is primarily influenced by emotions and suggests a short time horizon for 
the respondent (see Section 4.3). Regarding the first years of the Nazi regime, it could be 
argued, for example, that under the impression of the economic upheavals caused by the 
Great Depression, people may have attached greater weight to the significant decline in un-
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employment from 1933 onwards than to other determinants (e.g. freedom). This is presum-
ably due to the distinction between life satisfaction and happiness. 
A further possibility for modifying the DDI arises in the field of social inequality. There 
is no doubt that inequality plays – and has played – an important role in all areas of life 
(Spree 1981; Kaelble 1983; Gruen/Klasen 2013). Here it would be appropriate to use the 
United Nations approach – the inequality-adjusted HDI – as a starting point for correcting 
the DDI for inequality. However, since this approach raises all kinds of questions with regard 
to the measurement of inequality, data availability and formal implementation using the DDI 
formula, no attempt has been made here. Rather, I leave this to future research.27 
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Appendix: DDI data 
 
Tab. A.1: Variants of the DDI (equal weighting kept) 
        
Year Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3 Year Variant 1 Variant 2 Variant 3 
        
        
1920 0.415 0.556 0.485 1936 0.415 0.460 0.320 
1921 0.436 0.572 0.503 1937 0.422 0.470 0.325 
1922 0.432 0.573 0.499 1938 0.439 0.481 0.335 
1923 0.424 0.564 0.493 1939 0.474 0.491 0.355 
1924 0.427 0.578 0.496 1949 0.560 0.676 0.620 
1925 0.410 0.571 0.475 1950 0.570 0.682 0.629 
1926 0.407 0.565 0.472 1951 0.594 0.695 0.648 
1927 0.420 0.574 0.484 1952 0.605 0.703 0.657 
1928 0.438 0.582 0.499 1953 0.615 0.709 0.665 
1929 0.447 0.579 0.507 1954 0.627 0.718 0.675 
1930 0.458 0.572 0.508 1955 0.631 0.739 0.694 
1931 0.466 0.569 0.515 1956 0.641 0.746 0.702 
1932 0.456 0.558 0.507 1957 0.661 0.757 0.718 
1933 0.446 0.464 0.353 1958 0.670 0.762 0.725 
1934 0.442 0.480 0.350 1959 0.684 0.771 0.737 
1935 0.428 0.458 0.328 1960 0.707 0.789 0.760 
        
 
Notes: Variant 1: Geometrically averaged, excluding freedom index; variant 2: Arithmetically averaged, includ-
ing freedom index; variant 3: Geometrically averaged, including freedom index. 
Source: See text. 
 
Tab. A.2: Variants of the DDI (weighted average, weighting schemes 1 and 2) 
      
Year Variant 4 Variant 5 Jahr Variant 4 Variant 5 
      
      
1920 0,517 0,404 1936 0,407 0,431 
1921 0,543 0,447 1937 0,415 0,438 
1922 0,543 0,436 1938 0,425 0,446 
1923 0,539 0,440 1939 0,428 0,458 
1924 0,571 0,467 1949 0,734 0,619 
1925 0,568 0,467 1950 0,740 0,628 
1926 0,575 0,471 1951 0,753 0,643 
1927 0,574 0,472 1952 0,761 0,654 
1928 0,583 0,486 1953 0,766 0,654 
1929 0,577 0,480 1954 0,777 0,671 
1930 0,590 0,510 1955 0,795 0,674 
1931 0,601 0,515 1956 0,802 0,678 
1932 0,601 0,523 1957 0,810 0,685 
1933 0,425 0,460 1958 0,818 0,701 
1934 0,432 0,458 1959 0,824 0,709 
1935 0,408 0,435 1960 0,835 0,717 
      
 
Notes: Variant 4: Geometrically averaged, including freedom, weighted average, weighting scheme 1; Variant 
5: Geometrically averaged, including freedom, weighted average, weighting scheme 2. Scheme according to 
Ovaska/Takashima-data and scheme 2 according to Bjørnskov et al.-data. 




RESH Discussion Paper Series 
 
No. 1 / 2020 Mark Spoerer 
Did Firms Profit from Concentration Camp Labour? A Critical Assessment 
of the Literature 
No. 2 / 2020  Tobias A. Jopp 
A Happiness Economics-Based Human Development Index for Germany 
(1920-1960) 
No. 3 / 2020 Tobias A. Jopp/Mark Spoerer 
Teaching Historical Statistics: Source-Critical Mediation of Aims and Methods 
of Statistical Approaches in Historiography  
No. 4 / 2020 Mark Spoerer 
The Short Third Reich: On Continuities in Socio-Economic Structures 
between the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich and the Federal Republic 
No. 5 / 2020 Tobias A. Jopp/Mark Spoerer 
How Political Were Airbus and Boeing Sales in the 1970s and 1980s? 
No. 6 / 2020 Jonas Scherner/Mark Spoerer 
Infant Company Protection in the German Semi-Synthetic Fibre Industry: 
Market Power, Technology, the Nazi Government and the Post-1945 World 
Market 
No. 7 / 2020 Michael Buchner/Tobias A. Jopp/Mark Spoerer/Lino Wehrheim 
On the Business Cycle of Counting – or How to Quantify Quantification. 








DOI 10.2583/epub.43435                  RESH Papers – ISSN 2701-2050 
 
 
